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FIGHTING THE FTCA: MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE, VETERANS, AND THE VA 
Taylor C. Spillers* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Never in my career have I encountered an individual with 
that many [medical] errors and misdiagnoses.” – Margie Scott, 
MD1 
 
Dr. Levy, who served as the Chief of Pathology at the 
Fayetteville Veterans Health Care System of the Ozarks 
(“Fayetteville VA”) from 2005 to 2018, diagnosed veterans with 
an error rate of 10%.2  The “pathology practice average is 0.7%.”3  
Of the more than 3,000 cases Dr. Levy misdiagnosed, 589 were 
classified as “Level 3 (major) errors” which should always 
“trigger an [internal] investigation.”4  Unfortunately, no 
investigations ensued until Dr. Levy’s ultimate arrest, although 
the Fayetteville VA addressed Dr. Levy’s behavior repeatedly 
throughout his employment. 
In 2015, the Fayetteville VA received numerous complaints 
accusing Dr. Levy of drinking on the job, all of which he denied.5  
 
        * J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022.  Editor-in-Chief of the 
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022.  The author sincerely thanks Dr. Frankie Griffin for his 
insight into the medical profession and guidance throughout the writing process. The author 
also gives a special thank you to Monte Sharits as the initial inspiration behind this Comment. 
Lastly, the author thanks the Arkansas Law Review for their commitment to diligent editing; 
and her mother, father, and brother for their constant encouragement and support. 
1. Ninette Sosa & Garrett Fergeson, Former VA Pathologist Sentencing Continues into 
2nd Day, KNWA FOX24 (Jan. 21, 2021), [https://perma.cc/T8GL-ULNU] (Dr. Margie Scott 
is the Medical Center Director at the Central Arkansas Veterans Healthcare System).  
2. Id. 
3. Doug Thompson, Hidden Errors of Doctor Told in Courtroom, ARK. DEMOCRAT 
GAZETTE (Jan. 22, 2021), [https://perma.cc/R7PB-Y6QZ].  
4. For context, the VA conducted a nationwide review around 1990 and found just 100 
Level 3 errors total.  Dr. Levy had 589 in just thirteen years.  Sosa & Fergeson, supra note 
1.  
5. Id.   
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In 2016, the Fayetteville VA caught Dr. Levy actively practicing 
medicine with a blood alcohol level of 0.39 and temporarily 
suspended him.6  Dr. Levy was allowed to resume his position as 
the Chief of Pathology and maintain his annual salary of $225,000 
after completing three months of rehab, swearing to abstain from 
intoxicating substances, and agreeing to random drug and alcohol 
testing.7  For the next two years, Dr. Levy ingested a chemical 
known as “2-methyl-2-butanol” to achieve a drunken state while 
going undetected on forty different urine and blood samples he 
submitted during that time.8  The Fayetteville VA finally fired Dr. 
Levy in 2018 after he was arrested for driving under the influence, 
and an investigation into his former patients began.9  Dr. Levy 
took an oath as a physician “to do no harm” but ultimately told 
hundreds of veterans they had cancer when they did not, or that 
they did not have cancer when, in fact, they did.10  He also 
actively concealed his mistakes by falsifying medical records to 
appear as though another pathologist agreed with his diagnoses.11  
Dr. Levy’s case is just one example, although a particularly 
egregious example, of medical malpractice in the United States, 
and more specifically, at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 
(the “VA”).12  According to the National Practitioner Data Bank, 
roughly 11,000 to 13,000 medical malpractice payments are made 
every year nationally.13  412 of those payments were made on 
behalf of VA providers in 2019.14  Across the board, actual 
medical malpractice numbers are significantly higher considering 
95% of legitimate malpractice victims do not have “meaningful 
access to the civil justice system . . . unless their damages are 
significantly larger than [normal],” and many victims simply 
 
6. Id.   
7. Id. 
8. Id.   
9. Sosa & Fergeson, supra note 1.   
10. Id.   
11. Id.  
12. The term “VA” is used to encompass the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, in 
general, rather than one specific administration within the Department.  See generally About 
VA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., [https://perma.cc/65BG-764C] (Apr. 6, 2021). 
13. Data Analysis Tool, NAT’L PRAC. DATA BANK, [https://perma.cc/PD8J-58W6]. 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (data represents the year of payment, not the year the malpractice 
occurred).  
14. See infra Appendix I.  
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choose not to file lawsuits.15  For instance, while approximately 
1% of hospital patients are injured by malpractice each year, 
fewer than 2% of those injured will file claims.16  Studies also 
show that “the poor and elderly are [even] less likely to sue,” 
which, demographically speaking, encompasses many veterans.17 
When veterans do bring medical malpractice claims,18 
however, they find themselves in starkly different legal situations 
compared to non-veterans (“civilians”).19  Rather than file a 
typical medical malpractice lawsuit in state court against the 
provider or institution directly responsible for the harm, veterans 
can only sue the United States of America through the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).20  This Article argues that the FTCA 
should not provide immunity to medical professionals at the VA 
because it significantly limits veterans’ access to attorneys, to 
courts, and to damage awards.  Part I introduces the FTCA and 
explores the juxtaposition between civilians and veterans injured 
by medical malpractice.  Part II demonstrates why the FTCA is 
not only a less favorable option for veterans but one that places 
veterans at a significant disadvantage compared to civilians.  Part 
III argues that shielding medical professionals from individual 
liability under the FTCA ultimately harms the reputation of the 
VA and the providers who deliver quality and competent care to 
veterans.  With recent (and longstanding) calls for change at the 
VA, removing the FTCA and its immunity in medical malpractice 
lawsuits is a necessary step towards giving veterans the care they 
deserve. 
 
15. See Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical 
Liability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 154 (2014).  
16. Id. at 153.  
17. William B. Weeks et al., Tort Claims Analysis in the Veterans Health 
Administration for Quality Improvement, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 335, 340 (2001). 
18. For clarification, this is only true if the alleged medical malpractice occurred at a 
VA medical center and/or at the hands of a medical practitioner employed by the Federal 
Government.  The FTCA does not apply to veterans who are injured by medical malpractice 
at a privately owned and operated hospital or medical facility and/or a medical practitioner 
in private practice.  See KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT 
CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 7-8 (2019), [https://perma.cc/5FSD-4WKE].   
19. The term “civilian” is used throughout this article only to distinguish between 
veterans and non-veterans.   
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7316.  
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II.  BACKGROUND  
A. Department of Veterans Affairs Overview  
There are currently more than nineteen million veterans in 
the United States who courageously served in the U.S. Army, 
Navy, or Air Force.21  As compensation for their service, veterans 
are entitled to free healthcare benefits through the VA.22  More 
than nine million of those former servicemen and women utilize 
and rely on the VA Health Care System today.23  Although free 
for veterans, the VA is publicly funded.24  In the 2019 fiscal year 
alone, more than eighty billion taxpayer dollars went toward 
funding veterans’ medical care.25 
As America’s largest integrated health care system with 
1,454 health care facilities, including 171 VA medical centers and 
1,283 outpatient sites across the United States, the VA is a 
veteran’s one-stop-shop for medical, dental, and vision care. 26  
Given the magnitude of services it provides, the VA employs 
more than 367,200 full-time health care professionals and support 
staff and serves as the “nation’s largest provider of graduate 
medical education” by partnering with academic institutions to 
provide nearly 117,000 residency, fellowship, and training 
positions.27  In addition to directly hiring providers, the VA also 
independently contracts with a range of health care 
 
21. Department of Veterans Affairs Statistics at a Glance, NAT’L CTR. FOR VETERANS 
ANALYSIS & STATS., [https://perma.cc/ZTT3-237R] (Dec. 31, 2019) [hereinafter Statistics 
at a Glance].  For purposes of these statistics, Marines are included in the Department of the 
Navy. 
22. See Eligibility for VA Health Care, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., 
[https://perma.cc/H5GB-S43Y] (Sept. 17, 2020).   
23. Statistics at a Glance, supra note 21.   
24. See Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System: How Much Does the Federal 
Government Spend on Health Care?, TAX POL’Y CTR., [https://perma.cc/7D6B-826J] (May 
2020).  
25. Id.  See also About VHA, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., 
[https://perma.cc/Y3M9-GP8M] (Apr. 9, 2021) (The health care system has an “annual 
budget of approximately $68 billion.”).  
26. About VHA, supra note 25.  These numbers are constantly changing as the VA 
expands and contracts.  These figures are current as of April 9, 2021. 
27. Id.  The VA also has more than 46,000 active volunteers and 15,000 affiliated 
medical faculty.  Id.  These numbers are constantly changing as the VA expands and 
contracts.  These figures are current as of April 9, 2021.  
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professionals.28  Unlike civilian patients who select their doctors, 
veterans are not afforded the right to choose their medical 
providers at the VA.29  Instead, veterans are assigned to a 
healthcare team at a specific VA location.30  
B. FTCA Overview  
In theory, every individual practicing medicine is susceptible 
to medical malpractice.  Roughly 99% of physicians in high-risk 
specialties and 75% of those in low-risk specialties face a medical 
malpractice claim by the age of 65.31  However, the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity protects healthcare providers32 employed by 
the VA—given their status as federal employees.33  Therefore, 
they cannot be sued in their individual capacity for medical 
malpractice even when they commit blatant wrongdoing, like Dr. 
Levy.34  Instead, the government assumes liability on their behalf 
under the FTCA.35  Therefore, when a veteran is harmed by the 
tortious conduct of a VA employee, the veteran’s only legal 
course of action is to sue the United States of America under the 
FTCA rather than file a typical medical malpractice lawsuit 
against the individuals or institutions responsible for the harm.36 
 
28. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 8-9.   
29. Your VA Primary Care Provider and PACT Team, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFS., [https://perma.cc/XM72-HEAM] (last visited Apr. 30, 2020).  
30. Id. (A veteran’s health care team includes a primary care provider, clinical 
pharmacist, registered nurse, and licensed practical nurse or medical assistant and clerk).  
31. Anupam B. Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 
NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE, 629, 629 (2011).  
32. Under the FTCA, a healthcare provider is “a physician, dentist, podiatrist, 
chiropractor, optometrist, nurse, physician assistant, expanded-function dental auxiliary, 
pharmacist, or paramedical (such as medical and dental technicians, nursing assistants, and 
therapists), or other supporting personnel.”  38 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(2). 
33. See 20 REASONS DOCTORS LIKE WORKING FOR THE VETERANS HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION 27 (2016), [https://perma.cc/RL6B-XGDL] [hereinafter 20 REASONS].   
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2671. 
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).  In order for the FTCA to cover VA employees, they must 
be “acting within the scope of [their] office or employment[,]” meaning they were hired to 
perform the act in question or were promoting the employer’s interest at the time they acted.  
LEWIS, supra note 18, at 11-12.  
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(1) (“[D]amages for personal injury, including death, 
allegedly arising from malpractice or negligence of a health care employee of the 
Administration in furnishing health care or treatment while in the exercise of that employee’s 
duties in or for the Administration shall be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding 
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1. Purpose and Function of the FTCA 
Before the FTCA’s enactment in 1946, a victim injured by a 
tortious government employee could only recover by asking 
“Congress to enact private legislation affording them relief[.]”37  
Unsurprisingly, private legislation was rarely granted.38  To 
combat this problem and provide victims with a more practical 
means of compensation, Congress created the FTCA and shifted 
the burden of deciding complicated tort claims from Congress to 
the courts.39  Along with its “compensatory purpose, the FTCA 
also aims to ‘deter tortious conduct by federal personnel’ by 
rendering the United States liable for the torts of its agents[.]” 40  
Congress hoped that this would “incentiviz[e] the government to 
carefully supervise its employees.”41  While the FTCA is an 
expansive and comprehensive statute, this Article focuses only on 
the FTCA in the context of medical malpractice at the VA. 
Proponents of the FTCA, including Congress, recognize the 
FTCA’s limitations.42  They argue, however, that veterans should 
generally prefer to sue the government (under the FTCA) rather 
than the individual physician (under a civilian medical 
malpractice claim) because the government has deeper pockets 
than the physician.43  In particular, every payment made by the 
government comes from a “permanent and indefinite 
 
by reason of the same subject matter against the health care employee (or employee’s estate) 
whose act or omission gave rise to such claim.”). 
37. See LEWIS, supra note 18, at 4.  
38. See id.  
39. See id. at 5-6.  
40. Id. (quoting Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).  
41. Id. 
42. See Thomas K. Kruppstadt, Determining Whether a Physician is a United States 
Employee or an Independent Contractor in a Medical Malpractice Action Under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 223, 225-26 (1995) (“Occasionally [it is within] the 
plaintiff’s best interest . . . to argue that the government physician is an independent 
contractor . . . if [they] prefer[] a jury trial, a state court, or a state statute of limitations that 
is longer than the two year federal statute of limitations [imposed under the FTCA].”).  
43. See Christa L. Britton, Torts: Anderson v. Eichner — Although Faculty Physicians, 
Resident Physicians, and Interns Face Private Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice, the 
State is Immune, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 537, 547 (1996); see also Kruppstadt, supra note 42, at 
224-25. 
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appropriation” known as the Judgment Fund (the “Fund”).44  
Congress created the Fund in 1956 to eliminate the need for 
Congress to determine, settle, and allocate appropriations for each 
claim brought against the United States.45  “Originally, the Fund 
was available only for judgments . . . less than $100,000,” which 
Congress believed would cover 98% of claims.46  However, this 
proved to be a grossly inaccurate estimate as judgments 
skyrocketed by the mid-1970s.47  Since that time, the Fund no 
longer has a monetary cap and awards of any amount may be 
appropriated, including attorneys’ fees, post-judgment interest, 
court fees, and compensation for court-appointed experts.48   
Nevertheless, most Americans know little to nothing about 
the Fund or its sizable payments.49  In 2019, the Fund allocated 
more than $100,000,000 solely to victims of medical malpractice 
at the VA.50  Notably, the Fund makes payments of this 
magnitude every year on behalf of negligent VA providers.  
Figure 1 represents the allocation of funds, both at the 




44. VIVIAN S. CHU & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42835, THE JUDGMENT 
FUND: HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION, AND COMMON USAGE 3 (2013), 
[https://perma.cc/NM3X-XUZN] [hereinafter CRS JUDGMENT FUND].  
45. Id. at 2-3.  
46. Id. at 4. 
47. See id.  
48. See id. at 8-9 (describing costs allowable under awards paid from the Fund, 
including other costs approved under 28 U.S.C. §1920, such as transcripts, fees related to 
witnesses, materials for presentation in the case, and docket fees).  
49. See Sen. Deb Fischer & Sen. Cory Gardner, Senators Fischer and Gardner: Obama 
Administration Is Irresponsible and Risky with Judgment Fund, TIME (Oct. 13, 2016), 
[https://perma.cc/Z4QY-CLBX] (explaining that the Senators “introduced the Judgment 
Fund Transparency Act . . . to see how taxpayer dollars are spent”). 
50. See infra Figure 1.  
51. Judgment Fund Payment Search, BUREAU FISCAL SERV., [https://perma.cc/Q374-
LPNV] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).  Search results from January 1 to December 31 each 
year.  Required Search Field refined to Department of Veteran Affairs.  Optional Search 
Fields refined as follows:  (1) Type:  Principal; (2) Code and Description:  28 U.S.C. 1346(b) 
Med Mal; 28 U.S.C. 2677 Med Mal; and 28 U.S.C. 2672 Med Mal; (3) Payment Amount:  
N/A  Administrative payments represent settlements made at the administrative level.  
Litigative payments represent payments made at the federal court level.  See infra Appendix 
I (listing the precise payments per calendar year).  
340 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  74:2 
 
 
Fund values only represent the monetary value of 
settlements and judgments paid by the government to its victims 
and do not encompass the total cost of medical malpractice paid 
by the government.52  On top of Fund totals, the government also 
pays to defend each medical malpractice claim.53  For instance, 
the government pays roughly $11,300,000 per year to retain VA 
defense attorneys.54  Unsurprisingly, the “Fund remains a source 
of continued controversy and discussion . . . .”55 
 
 
2. Mechanics of a FTCA Medical Malpractice Lawsuit  
In practice, medical malpractice claims function much 
differently under the FTCA than medical malpractice claims 
brought by civilians against providers in their individual capacity.  
While both veteran and civilian malpractice claims use the 
 
52. See Judgment Fund, BUREAU FISCAL SERV., [https://perma.cc/NY7B-KV24] (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2020).  
53. See Weeks et al., supra note 17, at 340-43 (“[O]ther hidden costs—time when 
providers are giving depositions, time when administrators are reviewing claims—make the 
overall cost of tort claims [within the VA] much more substantial” than the reported Fund 
numbers.). 
54. Id. at 335, 343.  Note that reported values are from 1989 to 2000 and could be 
substantially higher today.  
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substantive law of the state where the tortious conduct occurred, 
the FTCA substantially changes the procedural law governing a 
veteran’s claim. 56  The two major changes include whom to file 
a lawsuit against and how.  
a. Whom to File a Lawsuit Against under the FTCA 
Civilians injured by medical malpractice may tailor their 
lawsuit towards a multitude of defendants, including the tortious 
provider, the hospital, and the insurance company that provides 
malpractice insurance to the provider.57  Veterans injured by 
medical malpractice have only one option:  the United States of 
America.  Not only does the FTCA control who the defendant is, 
but it also places many veterans in an uncomfortable position by 
forcing them to sue the country they once honorably served.58  
The only time a veteran can escape the FTCA and, instead, sue 
the tortious provider through a typical, state malpractice claim is 
when that provider happens to be an independent contractor to the 
VA.59   
Still, the distinction between employees and independent 
contractors has not always been clear and has hindered many 
veterans’ chances of recovery altogether.  Veteran Brian Tally 
serves as one example.  Tally filed a claim under the FTCA after 
his doctor—whom Tally believed to be a VA employee—failed 
to discover a bone-eating staph infection in his spine.60  It took 
the VA more than a year to inform Tally that his doctor was 
actually an independent contractor.61  Not only was Tally’s 
lawsuit against the United States dismissed at that point, but the 
 
56. See TULLY RINCKEY, A GUIDE TO SUING THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 3-4 (2011), [https://perma.cc/MGH3-PCYJ] 
[hereinafter GUIDE TO SUING THE VA]. 
57. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, What Is Accountability In Health 
Care?, 124 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 229, 230 (1996). 
58. Cf. James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons From the History 
of Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135, 205 n.464 (2011) 
(offering patriotism as a reason that many veterans of the Vietnam War were reluctant to sue 
the U.S. government for health complications stemming from exposure to Agent Orange).  
59. See LEWIS, supra note 18, at 9.  
60. Leo Shane III, After a Years-long Fight, Veterans Will See New Medical 
Malpractice Protections, MIL. TIMES. (Jan. 6, 2021), [https://perma.cc/H4V2-P2SX,/]. 
61. Id. 
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statute of limitations had expired on a potential medical 
malpractice lawsuit against the doctor.62  Tally was therefore left 
without legal recourse.63  In response to Tally’s preventable 
situation, legislators passed a bill in January 2021 mandating that 
department officers “clearly identify the employment status of 
any individuals involved in [a veteran’s] case within a month of a 
veteran submitting a malpractice claim.”64  The remainder of this 
Article assumes the tortfeasor was a VA employee.  
b. How to File a Lawsuit under the FTCA 
While civilians can make written demands or file 
complaints in state court, veterans must submit an “administrative 
claim” to the VA’s Regional Counsel (the “Agency”) before they 
can file a lawsuit in federal court.65  This two-step procedure was 
intended to “ease court congestion” and “provide fairness to 
plaintiffs” by encouraging more settlements at the administrative 
level “that would lead to less work for all [the parties] 
involved.”66   
Administrative claims are made by submitting a Standard 
Form 95 (“SF-95”) to the Agency within two years of the claim’s 
accrual.67  The SF-95 is a two-page, generic form that essentially 
asks the veteran to divulge the basis of the claim, the nature and 
extent of the injury, and the sum certain amount of the claim 
before conducting formal discovery.68  The dollar amount written 
here is an absolute limit on the amount sought and cannot be 
raised at any point in the future unless a veteran shows “newly 
discovered evidence [that was] not reasonably discoverable at the 




64. Id.; see also Veterans Receive New Medical Malpractice Protections, A.B.A. (Jan. 
29, 2021), [https://perma.cc/YQ9P-Q54S]. 
65. See GUIDE TO SUING THE VA, supra note 56, at 13-14. 
66. Daniel Shane Read, The Courts’ Difficult Balancing Act to Be Fair to Both Plaintiff 
and Government Under the FTCA’s Administrative Claims Process, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 
785, 791-92 (2005).  
67. GUIDE TO SUING THE VA, supra note 56, at 13-14 (A claim accrues at “the time 
the injury and its cause should have been discovered by a reasonable person.”). 
68. See STANDARD FORM 95, [https://perma.cc/B8FX-SCV2]. 
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. . . .”69  After receiving the SF-95, the Agency has six months to 
either settle or deny the claim.70  If the Agency denies the claim, 
a veteran may appeal the decision once, giving the Agency 
another six months to reevaluate the claim before making a final 
determination.71   
After submitting an administrative claim, there are three 
situations that allow a veteran to file a formal lawsuit in federal 
court:  (1) the Agency denies the administrative claim, either 
initially or on appeal; (2) the Agency offers a settlement amount 
that the veteran believes is insufficient; or (3) the Agency does 
not respond to the administrative claim within six months.72  If 
the Agency denies the administrative claim (option 1), a veteran 
only has six months to file a lawsuit in federal court before the 
claim is “forever barred.”73  If a settlement or verdict is reached 
at any point in the administrative or adjudicative process, monies 
are taken from the Fund, given to the veteran, and the case is 
closed.74  
III.  FTCA CREATES LIMITATIONS ON VETERANS’ 
MALPRACTICE OPTIONS  
The FTCA not only changes the who and how of medical 
malpractice, but it also takes away certain legal rights that 
civilians in state malpractice claims otherwise enjoy.  The FTCA 
is not only a less favorable option for veterans but also an unfair 
option because it limits their access to attorneys, courts, and 
damage awards.  
A. Limited Access to Attorneys  
Medical malpractice is already a complex area of law and 
practiced by few attorneys.75  Most attorneys avoid medical 
 
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b).  
70. See GUIDE TO SUING THE VA, supra note 56, at 18-19.  
71. 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b) (2021).   
72. GUIDE TO SUING THE VA, supra note 56, at 3. 
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 
74. See CRS JUDGMENT FUND, supra note 44, at 6. 
75. See e.g., Stephen Daniel & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, Specialization, and 
Medical Malpractice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1060-61 (2006).   
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malpractice lawsuits because they are “complex, risky, and 
expensive to prepare” in relation to the average personal injury 
case.76  One study on the caseload composition of 541 plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in Texas showed that more than half of the attorneys, 
54.4%, did not handle a single medical malpractice case for this 
reason.77  Of the attorneys “who handled at least one malpractice 
matter . . . the median percentage of their business made up by 
malpractice [was only] 10 percent[.]”78  Attorneys reported that 
they would rather diversify their case composition to avoid the 
risk of losing all the money spent preparing a medical malpractice 
case if the case was ultimately lost.79  Only 46 of the 541 attorneys 
devoted 50% or more of their business to medical malpractice.80   
Like all lawsuits, obtaining legal representation is crucial.  
For instance, represented veterans often recover twice as much as 
those who submit their claims without the help of an attorney.81  
Unfortunately, however, the FTCA adds an additional layer of 
confusion and difficulty to medical malpractice claims, making a 
veteran’s case even less appealing to an already small number of 
attorneys willing to try medical malpractice cases.  Attorneys, 
themselves, describe lawsuits under the FTCA as “trickier than 
suing a private citizen”82 and “unduly confusing and complex 
without the guidance of an attorney [who has] particular 
experience in filing malpractice claims on behalf of veterans.”83  
The most deterring aspect of a veteran’s case, however, is the 
FTCA’s cap on attorneys’ fees.  
 
76. Id. at 1061 (A lawyer who only handles a minimal amount of medical malpractice 
cases noted, “[M]alpractice cases are really expensive to develop . . . [A]nyone can take a 
car wreck case and try it, but for the medical malpractice cases you’ve got to know more 
about the medicine.”).  
77. Id. at 1060.  
78. Id. at 1061.  
79. Id. at 1060-61 (one lawyer reported losing $50,000 on just one case).  
80. Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1061.  
81. Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospital Medical Malpractice, NAT’L TRIAL L., 
[https://perma.cc/DX3Z-9UYJ].  
82. David Goguen, Suing the Government for Negligence: The Federal Tort Claims 
Act, NOLO, [https://perma.cc/QV2J-Z5DK] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021) (“[Y]ou will have to 
jump through a number of hoops, and the lawsuits are subject to a lengthy and sometimes 
confusing list of limitations.”).  
83. VA Malpractice Attorneys in Orange County, HODES MILMAN, LLP, 
[https://perma.cc/8CUH-VCEY] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021). 
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1. FTCA Cap on Attorneys’ Fees 
Under the FTCA, if the government settles the case at the 
administrative level (that is, after a SF-95 form is filed with the 
Agency but before a lawsuit is filed in federal court), an attorney 
is only entitled to 20% of the settlement award.84  If, on the other 
hand, a veteran prevails later in federal court, the attorney is 
entitled to 25% of the award.85  These percentages are extremely 
low for medical malpractice cases.  Contingency fees in civilian 
cases range from 33% to 40% on average,86 and studies 
demonstrate that capping this fee makes it less likely an attorney 
will try the case.87  Although 33% to 44% contingency fees can 
portray medical malpractice attorneys as “greedy, opportunistic 
lawyer[s]” that take even the weakest cases simply to profit off 
the “extravagant amounts” awarded, high contingency fees 
coupled with high damage awards are necessary to offset the high 
cost of litigation.88  Lawyers frequently decline to take even the 
most obvious malpractice cases when the potential damages do 
not offset the costs associated with taking the case.89  Moreover, 
the judicial system has various safety nets in place to discourage 
attorneys from filing frivolous lawsuits.90 
 
84. 28 U.S.C § 2678.  
85. 28 U.S.C § 2678.  
86. Shepherd, supra note 15, at 166. 
87. Steven Garber et al., Do Noneconomic Damages Caps and Attorney Fee Limits 
Reduce Access to Justice for Victims of Medical Negligence?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
637, 681 (2009) (study demonstrating that attorneys are less likely to take meritorious 
medical malpractice cases when noneconomic damage caps and attorney fees limits would 
reduce attorney fees); cf. Shephard, supra note 15, at 155 (explaining that many “damage-
restricting tort reforms have [already] made it economically infeasible for attorneys to take 
many medical malpractice cases.”). 
88. See Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1052. 
89. See Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1064 (associated costs include screening, 
preparing, litigating, billable hours, referral costs, and other overheads); see also A. Russell 
Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events due to Negligence: 
Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991) 
(“Trial lawyers usually accept only the relatively few cases that have a high probability of 
resulting in a judgment of negligence with an award large enough to defray the high costs of 
litigation.”).  
90. Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False 
Premises Behind “Tort Reform”, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 357, 359 (2005) 
(“[T]he contingency fee arrangement[, itself,] . . . screens out baseless lawsuits.”); see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (possible sanctions imposed for filing baseless claims).   
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A single medical malpractice case can take up to $500,000 
merely to litigate, with the average just below $100,000.91  For 
comparison, the median litigation cost for an automobile tort case 
is $43,000.92  Real property cases typically cost $66,000 to litigate 
and contract cases average around $91,000 in litigation 
expenses.93  Medical malpractice cases cost substantially more 
because attorneys must interpret the law and the medicine.94  For 
instance, medical malpractice lawyers report spending $10,000 
on experts simply to determine whether to take the case initially.95  
While “specialists” in the field often hire “nurse-lawyers” or 
“physician-lawyers” to “internalize some of [these] important 
expert costs[,]” many attorneys do not have this luxury.96  Instead, 
they must hire medical experts to ensure their cases are 
adequately screened and litigated.97  Of course, the more 
specialized the expert, the more expensive the hourly billing.98  
For example, experts in emergency medicine bill at a national 
average rate of $381 per hour to review a case, whereas, experts 
in neurosurgery bill at $741 per hour.99  Calling medical experts 
at trial is even pricier, at $494 per hour for emergency medicine 
and $1,134 per hour for neurosurgery.100   
Along with expert costs, malpractice attorneys themselves 
expend sizable hours on each case.101  Specifically, 472 average 
billable hours per case if it “progress[es] all [the] way through 
trial and post-disposition proceedings.”102  In contrast, attorneys 
 
91. Shepherd, supra note 15, at 165-66 (at the very least, attorneys expect to spend 
$50,000).  
92. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, 
20 CT. STAT. PROJECT 1, 7 (2013), [https://perma.cc/69P3-DUCM]. 
93. Id. 
94. See Shepherd, supra note 15, at 165; see also Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 
1061. 
95. Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1063-64. 
96. Id. at 1062.  Attorneys were considered “specialists” if “[medical] malpractice 
comprised 50 percent or more of their business.”  Id. at 1061.  
97. Id. at 1062. 
98. See Expert Witness Fee Calculator, EXPERT INST., [https://perma.cc/JF49-Z9LT] 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2021).  
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. See Hannaford-Agor & Waters, supra note 92, at 6.  
102. Id.  Cf. Anupam B. Jena et al., Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation 
Against US Physicians, 172 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 892, 893 (2012) (reporting that 
it takes thirty-nine to forty-three months to reach a verdict in court).  
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only expend 196 billable hours on automobile cases from start to 
finish, 284 hours on real property cases, and 367 hours on contract 
cases.103   
All in all, plaintiffs’ attorneys are not reimbursed for these 
expenses, if at all, until the case is closed.  Typically, attorneys 
will pay the litigation costs if they lose the case.104  If they win 
the case, the plaintiff will usually pay for the litigation costs in 
addition to the agreed upon contingency fee.105  Since “attorneys 
bear the risk of paying the litigation costs if a case loses, 
contingen[cy] fee arrangements require attorneys to evaluate 
cases in terms of the risks and potential returns of the case.”106  
Consider the associated risk of each contingency fee agreement 
when an attorney spends $50,000 litigating a case worth only 
$150,000 in damages:  
(1) In a civilian case, an attorney working at a 33% 
contingency fee “risk[s] the same amount he 
stands to earn; he pays $50,000 in litigation costs 
if he loses the case, and he earns a $50,000 
contingen[cy] fee if he wins the case.”107   
(2) An attorney working at a 20% contingency fee 
at the administrative level under the FTCA pays 
$50,000 in litigation costs if he loses the case and 
earns $30,000 if he settles the case.  
(3) An attorney working at a 25% contingency fee 
at the court level under the FTCA pays $50,000 in 
litigation costs if he loses the case and earns 
$37,500 if he wins the case.  
Under the FTCA, the attorney risks losing more than he stands to 
earn at both the administrative level and at the court level.  
Therefore, an attorney would surely deny this case at the 
screening stage.  Veterans need higher potential damages to offset 
the FTCA’s low attorneys’ fees in order to make their cases 
economically feasible for attorneys.  This is a considerable burden 
to overcome given most lawyers rarely accept a case with 
 
103. Hannaford-Agor & Waters, supra note 92, at 6.  
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potential damages below $100,000, while some take nothing 
below $1,000,000, working at contingency fees of 33% or 
more.108   
B. Limited Access to the Court System  
“The right to sue and defend in [American] courts is . . . 
one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship 
. . . .” 109  Even noncitizens are afforded access to American courts 
when they are injured on U.S. soil.110  So why then are veterans 
treated differently?  
1. Administrative Claim Hurdle  
To reach federal court, a veteran must first exhaust their 
administrative remedies.  While the administrative process was 
designed to “lead to less work for all [parties] involved[,]” it 
forces veterans to file an administrative claim, potentially wait a 
year, and then file a lawsuit in federal court.111  Civilians, on the 
other hand, file only one lawsuit directly with the court. 
The administrative claims process does not encourage 
adequate and appropriate settlements for every meritorious claim 
as Congress intended.  14.6% of claims (1,610 claims) filed at the 
VA from 1989 to 2000 were only settled after veterans exhausted 
their administrative remedies and proceeded to federal court.112  
Furthermore, Figure 1 demonstrates the sheer increase in 
payments made at the court level compared to the administrative 
level every year.113  Overall, the administrative claims process 
functions as an obstacle for many valid claims.  The Agency 
generally takes 375 days (12.5 months) to deny administrative 
claims and 444 days (14.8 months) to settle administrative 
 
108. Daniel & Martin, supra note 75, at 1065; see also Shepherd, supra note 15, at 154 
(explaining that attorneys routinely reject 90% of incoming malpractice claims for 
insufficient funds). 
109. Chambers v. Baltimore, 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
110. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see generally 28 U.S.C § 1391 (venue 
requirements). 
111. Read, supra note 66, at 792.   
112. Weeks et al., supra note 17, at 336.  
113. Supra Figure 1; see also infra Appendix I (precise values).  
2021 FIGHTING THE FTCA 349 
claims.114  Congress claims that these wait-times “ease court 
congestion” by filtering out meritless lawsuits.115  However, 
every claim that is denied at the administrative level, regardless 
of its merit, can still be filed in federal court after the Agency 
denies it.  Therefore, the process more likely “ease[s] court 
congestion” by disincentivizing the already small percentage of 
medical malpractice victims who wish to seek legal recourse from 
actually obtaining legal recourse. 
2. No Jury Trial Allowed 
Jury trials are considered a “fundamental constitutional 
right” in the United States enjoyed by nearly every civilian 
medical malpractice litigant.116  Jury trials are such a foundational 
aspect of the American legal system that many state courts have 
struck down entire laws as unconstitutional when they infringe on 
a jury’s power to decide medical malpractice cases.117  Veterans, 
however, are not given the right to a jury trial under the FTCA 
(assuming their case reaches the trial stage) and, instead, must 
undergo bench trials.118  In a bench trial, only one federal judge 
decides the case in its entirety, including whether the case has 
merit, and if so, how much compensation the veteran is entitled 
to.119  
Excluding the FTCA, bench trials are mandatory only in 
cases of pure questions of law and equity, such as divorce, child 
custody, permanent injunctions, and foreclosures—all much 
different from the standard medical malpractice case.120  The 
issue is not that bench trials are flawed per se.  In fact, there are 
certain circumstances where bench trials are preferred over jury 
 
114. Weeks et al., supra note 17, at 336 (days from the time an administrative claim 
was filed).  
115. See Read, supra note 66, at 791. 
116. B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United States, 467 
CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS & RELATED RSCH. 339, 341 (2009), [https://perma.cc/V46V-
3VCE]; see Boehm, supra note 90, at 366; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[T]he right of 
trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”). 
117. See e.g., Boehm, supra note 90, at 366 n.45 (one example is damage caps).   
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2402. 
119. See Trial by Jury May be a Better Choice Than a Bench Trial, HG.ORG, 
[https://perma.cc/STL3-J8WY] (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).  
120. Id. 
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trials, such as criminal cases where the defendant’s appearance is 
unfavorable or among unpopular parties like insurance 
companies.121  Instead, the problem is that those litigants 
strategically waived their right to a jury trial in favor of a bench 
trial, whereas veterans are forced to forgo their right to a jury trial 
regardless of their preferred trial strategy. 
C. Limited Damage Awards   
In addition to capping damage awards to the amount 
written on the SF-95 filed before discovery takes place,122 
veterans cannot receive punitive damages under the FTCA.123  
Albeit punitive damages are not usually awarded in civilian 
medical malpractice cases because doctor error is usually “simple 
human mistake” and “truly accidental[,]” they are nonetheless 
awarded when appropriate.124  Courts have found punitive 
damages appropriate in civilian cases in instances “of gross 
negligence and outrageous conduct by a health care 
provider[.]”125  The exact standard of conduct warranting punitive 
damages varies amongst jurisdictions, but usually involves 
conduct categorized as “malfeasance, misfeasance, or 
nonfeasance.”126  
For example, in Gomez v. Cabatic, a New York court 
awarded punitive damages to a civilian after an endocrinologist 
destroyed original medical records to avoid liability in a wrongful 
death suit involving her treatment of a child.127  The Tenth Circuit 
also upheld an award of punitive damages in Macsenti v. Becker, 
where a grossly impaired dentist passed out ten to fifteen times 
while performing dental surgery, keeping the patient sedated for 
ten long hours, and the patient suffered brain damage as a 
 
121. Id. 
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). 
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.  
124. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice 
Damage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 415-16 (2005).  But see 2 JOHN J. KIRCHER & 
CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 17:4 (2d ed. 2020) 
(“A significant number of cases in which punitive damages have been awarded against a 
professional involve members of the medical profession . . . .”). 
125. Sharkey, supra note 124, at 415.   
126. KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 124.  
127. Gomez v. Cabatic, 159 A.D.3d 62, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).  
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result.128  The court determined that these punitive damages were 
awarded for their “proper function of punishing the offender and 
deterring others so as to benefit society.”129 
Seemingly similar conduct has occurred at various VA 
establishments.  For example, at the Fayetteville VA, Dr. Levy 
tampered with medical records similar to the endocrinologist in 
Gomez and was impaired like the dentist in Macsenti while 
practicing medicine.130  Although Dr. Levy’s actions were just as 
egregious and harmful as the doctors’ actions in the civilian cases, 
punitive damages are off the table simply because a VA employee 
caused the harm—another unfair FTCA nuance.  This is despite 
the fact that punitive damages and the FTCA share a similar goal:  
punitive damages are awarded to “punish[] the offender and 
deter[] others,” 131 and the FTCA is “aim[ed] to ‘deter tortious 
conduct by federal personnel[.]’”132 
IV.  BENEFITS OF LETTING VETERANS ACCESS THE 
CIVILIAN MALPRACTICE SYSTEM 
As it currently stands, the FTCA draws a divide between 
conduct and accountability.  The FTCA is theoretically supposed 
to deter tortious conduct by holding the United States responsible 
for its employees’ actions,133 and the Fund is supposed to 
“provide an end to the ‘hardship and injustice’” caused by 
government employees.134  However, Americans persistently 
criticize the VA and the quality of care it delivers despite the 
 
128. Macsenti v. Becker, 237 F.3d 1223, 1242, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2001).  
129. Id. at 1245. 
130. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.  
131. Macsenti, 237 F.3d at 1245. 
132. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 5-6; cf. Michael Frakes & Anupam B. Jena, Does 
Medical Malpractice Law Improve Health Care Quality?, 143 J. PUB. ECON. 142 app. at 7 
(2016) (citation omitted), [https://perma.cc/H3EH-6ZKB] (“Nonetheless, despite the 
infrequent application of such awards, considering that punitive damages are generally not 
insured by liability carriers, it remains reasonable to believe that physicians may be sensitive 
to the threat posed by punitive awards.”). 
133. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 5-6 (quoting Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 
941 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).  
134. Bruce G. Hart, Jr., Medical Malpractice Protection Under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act: Protecting Both Physicians and Claimants, 58 FORDHAM L. REV., 1107, 1110 
n.19 (1990) (citing 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 65.01 at 3-3 to 3-4, 
(1989)).  
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Fund’s payouts.  In 2017, Americans ranked the VA last in 
popularity amongst ten similar federal agencies and departments, 
including the IRS and United States Postal Service.135  Multiple 
investigations and scandalous stories have surfaced in recent 
years too, calling attention to numerous hiring and reporting 
issues within the VA.136  Removing the FTCA from medical 
malpractice lawsuits at the VA would benefit veterans from a 
litigation standpoint by giving them the same legal rights as 
civilians.  It would also hold both VA providers and the VA 
system accountable for medical malpractice which, in the long 
haul, will improve veterans’ care.   
Under the FTCA, VA employees are practically invisible 
to the legal consequences of medical malpractice.  Administrative 
claims are mailed directly to the VA’s Regional Counsel, every 
settlement and judgement is taken directly from the Fund, and 
even “deposition[] [requests] by [a] claimant[‘s] counsel must be 
approved and coordinated by VA legal staff” before a physician 
partakes in any legal discussions.137  The VA also openly 
advertises immunity as one of the top twenty reasons doctors like 
working for the VA, stating in one hiring brochure:  
Medical personnel have statutory immunity from 
“individual” malpractice liability while acting within scope 
of employment. A VA physician cannot be sued in civil court 
for the malpractice (tort) claim. Providers feel less 
threatened by the malpractice climate while working for the 
government because if a patient sues a VA doctor, they are 
instead are [sic] suing the federal government . . . . Separate 
medical malpractice insurance is not required to be 
maintained.138 
Even when providers commit acts that would typically warrant 
punitive damages in a civilian setting, they remain immune from 
 
135. Kristen Bialik, The Changing Face of America’s Veteran Population, PEW RSCH. 
CTR. (Nov. 10, 2017), [https://perma.cc/8XYB-MEF8]. 
136. See, e.g., Donovan Slack, USA TODAY Investigation: VA Knowingly Hired 
Doctors with Past Malpractice Claims, Discipline for Poor Care, USA TODAY (Dec. 13, 
2017), [https://perma.cc/E3M3-MDQV]; Timeline: The Story Behind the VA Scandal, USA 
TODAY (May 21, 2014), [https://perma.cc/ZU7B-SEQ6] (Arizona VA scandal where records 
were falsified to hide wait times).   
137. 20 REASONS, supra note 33, at 27.  
138. Id.  
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liability.139  Despite their perpetual immunity under the FTCA for 
medical negligence, medical professionals are still reported to the 
National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”) whenever a medical 
malpractice payment is made on their behalf.140  Reporting 
requirements, therefore, subject the physician “to some degree of 
professional accountability[.]”141  However, the VA has slipped 
up on reporting and screening requirements in the past, meaning 
negligent providers have sometimes faced no degree of 
professional accountability. 
Per VA policy, hiring personnel must run a query of the 
NPDB before hiring an individual to ensure their “medical 
licenses are current and in good standing[.]”142  However, shady 
NPDB profiles “do[] not automatically disqualify a provider from 
working at VA medical centers” since each VA has broad 
discretion in the hiring process.143  Once a provider is hired, it is 
the VA’s responsibility to monitor the NPDB for “new adverse 
information about an existing provider” and address any other 
concerns pertaining to a provider’s clinical care.144  VA officials 
are required to report any serious concerns about a provider’s 
clinical care to state licensing boards.145  This gives state licensing 
boards the ability to “investigate and determine if a provider’s 
conduct or ability to deliver care warrants action against the 
provider’s medical license.”146 
 
139. See supra Part II.C.  
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 11131.   
The NPDB is an electronic repository administered by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services that collects and releases information on providers 
who either have been disciplined by a state licensing board, professional 
society, or health care entity, such as a hospital, or have been named in a 
medical malpractice settlement or judgment. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-152T, VA HEALTH CARE: ACTIONS NEEDED 
TO ENSURE PROVIDER QUALIFICATIONS AND COMPETENCE 1 (2019) (statement of Sharon 
M. Silas, Director Health Care before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, and House of Representatives) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].   
141. Britton, supra note 43, at 546. 
142. GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 1-2.  See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO-19-6, VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION: GREATER FOCUS ON 
CREDENTIALING NEEDED TO PREVENT DISQUALIFIED PROVIDERS FROM DELIVERING 
PATIENT CARE 13 (2019).  
143. GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 2. 
144. Id.  
145. Id. at 3.  
146. Id.  
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Be that as it may, “the VA Office of Inspector General and 
the media have reported . . . multiple cases of quality and safety 
concerns regarding specific VA providers.”147  The Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) highlighted these concerns, and 
the explicit disregard for VA policy, in a 2019 report.  
Specifically, the report reviewed 57 out of the 1,664 VA 
employees who had an adverse report in the NPDB as of 
September 30, 2016.148  In that sample alone, the VA “took action 
against some providers with disqualifying information in the 
NPDB but overlooked others.”149  One of the overlooked 
providers “surrendered [his] license in 2014, while [still] 
employed at [the] VA, but was not [terminated] by the VA 
medical center until after [the GAO’s] inquiries in 2018.”150  
Another provider was “prescribing controlled substances without 
appropriate registration” but was not reported to the Drug 
Enforcement Administration until after the GAO’s 
investigation.151   
The GAO “also found that VA medical centers hired or 
retained some . . . providers who they acknowledged had 
disqualifying adverse information in the NPDB, which is 
inconsistent with [VA] policy.”152  For instance, the VA “hired a 
provider who had a state license revoked for patient neglect and 
substandard care” at the time the provider was hired in 2014.153  
Many providers were also not reported to the NPDB or state 
licensing boards when their conduct warranted such reporting.  
One unreported provider had VA documentation showing that his 
“surgical incompetence resulted in numerous repeat surgeries for 
veterans.”154  Another provider “was terminated for cause related 
to patient abuse after only [two] weeks of work at the facility[,]” 
 
147. Id. (“[R]eport[s] range[d] from providers lacking appropriate qualifications to 
poor performance and provider misconduct . . . .”) 
148. GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 4 n.9. 
149. Id. at 6. 
150. Id.  
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. GAO REPORT, supra note 140, at 6. 
154. Id. at 13 (finding only one of nine providers under the GAO’s review were 
reported to the NPDB).  Reporting providers to the NPDB prevents “provider[s] who 
delivered substandard care at one VA medical center [from] obtain[ing] privileges at another 
VA medical center or at hospitals outside of [the] VA’s health care system.”  Id. at 14.  
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but still went unreported.155  Sadly, the failure to abide by VA 
policies leads “to unsafe care and potential harm” for veterans.156 
Instead of spending upwards of one hundred million 
taxpayer dollars every year to shield these providers, the 
government should require VA employees to procure their own 
liability insurance.  This is an obtainable objective too.  Nearly 
every medical professional outside of the VA has malpractice 
insurance that covers lawsuits brought against them, including 
independent contractors to the VA who are not protected by the 
FTCA.157  Most states require physicians to have malpractice 
insurance anyways, and many hospitals require it as a condition 
of granting hospital privileges.158  The only reason the VA does 
not require their employees to have traditional malpractice 
insurance is because they treat the FTCA as their malpractice 
insurance.159  However, no one at the VA pays a premium to have 
this “insurance,” it is simply handed to them.  The perception of 
immunity—especially as advertised—may be incentivizing 
doctors who are otherwise unemployable at other institutions 
because of their malpractice history to work for the VA.  
Requiring every VA provider to apply for and obtain independent 
medical malpractice insurance in the future would serve as an 
extra screening step for quality care at the VA.  
In 2017, Congress passed the VA Accountability and 
Whistleblower Protection Act to “remove Federal employees who 
undermine the public trust or fail the American people.”160  While 
debate is ongoing about whether the Act is successfully 
“chang[ing] the culture at the VA for the better[,]”161 scandalous 
 
155. Id. at 13. 
156. See id. at 3.  
157. See Bal, supra note 116, at 340. 
158. See id.; see also Understanding Medical Malpractice Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., 
[https://perma.cc/3AMX-WLWF] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).  
159. See 20 REASONS, supra note 33, at 27.   
160. Alana Abramson, President Donald Trump Just Delivered His First State of the 
Union. Read the Full Transcript., TIME (Jan. 30, 2018), [https://perma.cc/5T47-8NMC]; See 
also Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 
2017, S. 1094, 115th Cong. (2017).  
161. Nicole Ogrysko, Under New Accountability Act, VA Employees Fear One Mistake 
Will Cost Them Their Jobs, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 19, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/WUL4-LGFG] (worrying that the Act is causing the wrong individuals to 
be terminated).   
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stories such as that of Dr. Levy at the Fayetteville VA continue to 
shock and upset the public.  Not only does the lack of 
accountability at the VA physically and psychologically hurt 
veterans and their families, it also creates massive distrust within 
our nation’s largest healthcare system and tarnishes the reputation 
of the many VA employees who do provide quality care to our 
veterans.162  Perhaps placing accountability back on the physician 
and the institution, rather than the government, will successfully 
change the VA’s reputation for the better and ensure veterans 
receive the care they deserve.163   
V. CONCLUSION 
The FTCA significantly disadvantages veterans injured 
by medical malpractice at the VA. Not only does the FTCA 
require veterans to sue their country instead of the provider 
responsible for their harm, but it also reduces access to attorneys, 
courts, and damage awards.  Removing the FTCA and its 
immunity in medical malpractice lawsuits at the VA would create 
a nexus between provider conduct and accountability.  This can 
only benefit the VA’s reputation.  Most importantly, it would give 
veterans the same legal rights as civilians in medical malpractice 
lawsuits.  Veterans deserve, at the very least, the same treatment 
as civilians, and it is time they are afforded it.   
  
 
162. See, e.g., Sosa & Fergeson, supra note 1 (The Chief Investigator for the VA noted 
that, “[Dr.] Levy’s actions have hurt the ability to hire doctors at the [VA].”); cf. INST. OF 
MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (1999) (“Errors also are 
costly in terms of loss of trust in the health care system by patients and diminished 
satisfaction by both patients and health professionals. . . .  Health professionals pay with loss 
of morale and frustration at not being able to provide the best care possible.  Society bears 
the cost of errors as well, in terms of lost worker productivity . . . and lower levels of 
population health status.”).  
163. Cf. Frakes & Jena, supra note 132, at 158 (“All told, it appears that the relationship 
between health care quality and changes in clinical malpractice standards works in an 
expansionary direction only.  That is, once physicians provide a high level of quality, they 
may maintain such practices even when the law may loosen its expectations at a later date.  
In contrast, physicians who provide a quality of care that is below what is expected by the 
law raise their practice to meet the higher expectations set by the law.  Malpractice forces 
that alter the legal clinical standard to which physicians are held may therefore be effective 
in elevating the quality floor.”). 
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